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ASPECTS OF NEGATION IN CLASSICAL GREEK
by
Daniel J. Taylor
Department of the Classics
University of Illinois
Negation in classical Greek has traditionally been assumed to be,
as we might expect from the post-neogrammarian approach to syntax, a
surface structure phenomenon, although it has long been recognized
that the semantic component is in several instances responsible for
the pattern of negation. In these latter cases the received inter-
pretation is similar, though naively so, to a generative analysis, but
since the syntax of the classical languages is often little more than
classification—again based on the surface structure—with no inte-
grated theory or methodology underlying that classification, the
resulting description is an5rthing but coherent. In what follows I
would like to formalize some obvious and some not so obvious aspects
of negation in Greek from both a syntactic and semantic point of
view.
In point of fact negation in Greek is determined neither by the
surface nor by the deep structure but rather by the intermediate
structure. I assvime, as most Greek grammarians do, that the basic
negative, the negative of the simple deep structure, is ou; the sur-
face structure, however, contains both ou and me. This means accord-
ingly that in the process of generating sentences Greek converts ou
2
to me, though only under rather well-defined circ\amstances. Let me
exemplify.
Consider the following sentences.
(1) the man does not marry i.e. is not married
(2) the man dcas not have evils
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In each case the negative is ou in Greek. These sentences can he combined
in a niimber of ways r/ithout affecting the negative, hut when (l) is
subordinate to (2) in the form of a conditional clause, negative con-
version (ou-»me) occurs obligatorily in the if-clause, producing
(3) if the man does not marry, he (the man) does not have evils
with the negative me occurring in what is nov/ the protasis and ou re-
maining in the apodosis or main clause. Stated in purely descriptive
and traditional terms the negative of conditional clauses is me, but
A
it is clear, I hope, that the presence of me must be accoxxnted for by
an obligatory negative conversion rule.
Furthermore, the presence of an equi-NP in Greek is almost always
the immediate catalyst for further structui^al change of one sort or
bnother. In (3) the presence of an equi-NP may subsequently induce one
bf two possible changes, producing either a relative clause or a parti-
cipial construction.
(a) the man who does not marry does not have evils
(5) the man not marrying does not have evils
Regardless of which optional transformation is chosen, the process of
negation is identical in both (4) and (5); me negates the clause which
has undergone the structural change, while the main clause, unchanged
from the outset of the derivation, retains ou. Since Greek tends for
5
the most part m sentences like this to use the participle, sentence
(5) is precisely what we get in Menander'
s
\ A A
ho me gamon anthrppos ouk ekhei kaka
"""
A
the not marrying man not has evils.
A
The negative me is therefore predicated on a context sensitive
rule which converts ou to me. In (4) and (5) the presence of me is
determined solely by the underlying conditional in {3) , just as the
semantic interpretation derives from (3). If the intermediate struc-
ture does not contain a conditional or some other string requiring
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negative conversion, as in the derivation of merely descriptive rela-
tives and participles, then the deep structure negative ou is retained.
Traditional Greek grammars imply that the state of affairs outlined here
ottains in sentences of this type but of course do not explicitly de-
scribe the sentences in this v/ay, because to state that the particular
negative and likewise the semantics of the construction are determined
by an actual conditional in the "history" of the sentence is simply
beyond the scope of even the footnotes in our received grammars.
A similar analysis can and must be extended to other structures
where the presence of me is also determined by the intermediate stages
of the derivation but which are treated haphazardly, if at all, by our
school and descriptive grammars. We read in Plato's Phaedo (58B):
"As soon as the mission has begun, then, it is their law to keep the
city pure during that time, and to put no one to death before the ship
arrives at Delos and comes back again here; this often takes some
7
time, when the vdnds happen to delay them." Notice "it is their law
...to put no one to death," which is in the Greek: nomos estin autois
. .
.
medena apoktinnunai , with the negative me. In accordance vdth the
approach suggested above, negative conversion has taken place at some
point in the intermediate structure before this particular string was
nominalized and embedded in the higher sentence. The intermediate
stage of the derivation which we are seelcing is not difficult to find;
the law in effect stated, "Do not kill anyone," and this is a negative
comnend or prohibition which, like conditional clauses, requires the
negative me. It is the negative command in the underlying structure
which is responsible for the negative, and subsequent transformations
A
do not alter the ine. The precise form of the law—and law it seems
to have been, since Xenophon Mem IV, 8, 2 refers to it—we do not knov/,
but there are only two possibilities m Greek: me plus either an
9imperative or a subjunctive. This then is another example m v;hich
it is obvious that the surface structure does not determine the
choice of negative.
It is not so obvious, however, that the deep structure is not in-
volved, since the negative command or prohibition is considered to be
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an "independent" subjunctive. It is here that the traditional
philological account is especially at odds not only with modem
linguistics but also with ancient grammar. The subjunctive (or optative
for that matter) independent syntactically and semantically does
not exist in the deep structure, and its presence in the surface struc-
ture is to be "Explained in the same way that any other oblique mood
usage is explained, i.e. by complementation. Mood—at least in Greek
and Latin—is a complementizer, does not mean anything at all per se .
10
and appears in a sentence only by virtue of a transformational process.
The deep structure contains an abstract verb which requires a complement
sentence with its V in an oblique mrod. There is no need here for an
extended discussion of abstract syntax, since Robin Lakoff has devoted
a considerable amount of attenticn to the role played by abstract
verbs in Latin complementation, and I am content merely to refer to her
discussion. I am therefore postulating an abstract verb for the deep
structure of the Greek sentence in question and for those other Greek
sentences which have been claimed to exemplify an independent •usage of
the subjunctive. To quote Dr. Lakoff: "In this way, all the properties
of these independent constructions, which must be treated separately by
the philologist, are accounted for by postiilating verbs present in the
deep structure but absent in the surface structiir^, verbs whose syn-
tactic properties correspond to those of real verbs of the same
meaning-class," and furthermore "What is present in the deep structure
is a verb with semantic and syntactic properties similar to those found
in real verbs but with no phonological form; such verbs govern the
application of complemetizer-pla cement, complementizer-change, and some-
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times other riiles as well." Ultimately this verb is obligatorily
deleted; the negative command or prohibition is an intermediate struc-
ture governing negative conversion, not an "independent" subjunctive.
Interestingly the subjunctive was never considered independent
by the ancients themselves, as the etymology of 'subjunctive' may
well indicate. "The name subjunctive is due to the belief of the
13
ancient grammarians that the mood v/as always subordinate." Diomedes
states that the mood is so named, because in and of itself it does not
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express meaning (ouod ;ger se non exrjrimat sensum) . and Priscian states
that the subjunctive needs amung otner things another verb in order
to express its full meaning ( . . . altero verbo . ut perfectum significet
sensum).In sum then the concept of an abstract verb is not at all
antithetical to the study of the classical languages, and as we shall
see later, there are structures in Greek which simply cannot be explain-
ed except on the basis of an abstract verb in the deep structure.
Another example may suffice to exemplify further the combination
of negation and abstract verbs. When a speaker asks what he is to do
or say in a given situation, he uses the subjunctive (e.g. ti draso ?
what am I to do?). The construction is termed the deliberative subjunctive
or, alternatively, a question of appeal and is negated by me. Often,
however, the question is preceded by a verb form, e.g. boulei (do you
vdsh), but of course the presence of boxilei is optional. The omission
or deletion is traditionally considered ellipse, but it provides an
apposite parallel to what we term abstract syntax. Briefly, boulei
is the verb of the higher sentence in the deep structure, requires
the complementizer subjvmctive mood, governs negative conversion in
its complement sentence, and may then be optionally deleted. Precise-
ly the same procedure is followed by abstract verbs with but one sig-
nificant difference—the deletion rule is obligatory.
To recapitulate: I have argued that only one negative, ^r
is present in the deep structure of classical Greek, that under certain,
specific well-governed syntactic conditions this negative is converted
to ^ which remains regardless of subsequent transformations and which
will therefore appear in the surface structure, that abstract syntax
is a sine qua non of any adequate description of Greek grammar, and
that abstract syntax is intimately related to the pattern of negation
since it is the abstract verbal complex which governs negative con-
version in those structures which are traditionally termed independent
subjunctives and vi^hich are negated on the surface by me. There are,
however, other negative structures which appear to behave aberrantly
or at best idiosyncratically, and in what follov/s I shall attempt
to show that this behavior is, on the contrary, not at all odd
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and that these structures provide additional proof for negative conversion
and abstract syntax as well.
Inherently negative verts have long been recognized for what they
are by the classical grammatical tradition; e.g. every grammar provides
separate treatment for many of these verbs imder 'hindering' or some other
semantically equivalent rubric. The classification of inherently
negative verbs, although sophisticated in many respects, misses at
least one very important generalization. Consider the following
sentences:
(6)
(7)
elrgei se me graphein
eirgei se graphein
eirgei se to me graphein
eirgei se to graphein
eirgei se tou me graphein
eirgei se tou graphein
ouk eirgei se graphein
ovik eirgei se me' ou graphein
ouk eirgei se to me graphein
ouk eigei se to me ou graphein
All forms of (6) mean "he prevents you from writing," and all forms
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of (T) mean "he does not prevent you from writing." The variety
rf constructions may not completely boggle the mind, but it does
engender a certain amount of confusion; nevertheless the salient
characteristics of the surface structures can be found in almost any
grammar-of Greek. V/ith regard to the negatives in the lower sentence,
it can be seen at a glance that l) no negative is obligatory, 2) me
may accompany the complement, and 3) if the higher S is itself negated
and if the lower S has me
.
then ou also usually occurs in the lower
S, although as (7c) proves, it need not occiir. Therefore, the embedded
A
complement sentence may contain no negative, the negative me, or both
A
me and ou. These negatives are termed "redxmdant" or "sympathetic"
and "confirm" the negative idea (i.e. the inherert negation) in the
Ill
leading verb.
Such a description omits the observation that the complement
sentence can not itself be negated. Quite simply then, verbs of this
class do not admit a negatived complement, and this is a fact of the
native speakers' innate competence, not merely of their subjective
Sprachgefuhl , It is for this reason that, regardless of the presence
or the absence of negative(s) in the complement sentence, semantic
ambiguity could not arise under any circ\xmstanc€s in this environment.
What I have added to the traditional analysis of these verbs
is simply the crucial generalization v;hich accounts for the variation
in the surface structiire and yet also for the stability in the deep
structure or meaning and which relates the speakers' performance to
their competence. Yet it is not clear on the one hand what allows
this negative pattern to exist in the first place and on the other
hand how it is involved in the process of negative conversion, and
these are questions which deserve answers. The point of departtire is in
my opinion to be found in a recent treatment of inherent negators in
LatinJ It has been suggested that certain complementizei'fe in Latin
'•contained in them the negatives , that these verbs '[^sc, inherently
negative verbs -have as part of their tiieaning.'* This suggestion is,
1 "beiieve, correct.
In Greek the complementizer in sentences of the type imd.er con-
sideration is the accusative-infinitive; therefore negative-attachment
is ruled out, and if the inherent negation of the negative-meaning verb
is to be represented in any fashion in the surface structure, it must be
realized in the form of an actual negative. I suggest then that the
presence of mejoptional as was indicated above) in complements after
negative-meaning verbs of the class of verbs of preventing in Greek
is parallel to the presence of a negative element attached to the
A
complementizer in Latin in sentences of this kind. The me is therefore,
according to this interpretation, simply the segmental representation of
the negative element of the inherently negative verb. In short, the
A
traditional assumption that me confirms or affirms the negative idea
of the main verb is seen to be eminently sound and entirely correct.
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but it requires the more extensive theoretical point of view of
generative grammar and an analysis such as the one presented here in
order to interrelate the syntax and semantics of the negative patterns
foimd in structures containing inherently negative verbs.
Of the questions posed above, however, only the first has been
answered, and that only partially; me is acco-unted for, but the
ou TiAiich usually follows that me after a doubly negated (ou + inherent-
ly negative verb) higher sentence still remains as a "sympathetic"
negative, and this is only minimally adequate unless it can be shown
that the pattern corresponds to negative patterns elsewhere in the
language. I therefore propose to consider me ou here as a quasi-
compound, since ou, if present, obligatorily accompanies me and cannot
appear without it in this environment. As a compovind negative
following the simple negative of the higher S it is only natural, even
apart from the fact that the lower sentence cannot be negated, that the
A.
me ou does not affect the meaning of the sentence inasmuch as it is
19
no different from any other compound negative, ¥sy proposal then
relates the negative pattern here to the normal syntactic and semantic
behavior of negatives elsewhere, for negative reinforcement is a common-
place in Greek. The key to understanding the behavior of negatives
after verbs of "hindering" is the generalization, consistently over-
looked by the traditional grammars, which notes that these verbs do
not tolerate negation of their complements. Without this, it seems
that we must be content with a description, and a not very good one
at that, of the surface structure.
A
According to ray earlier argument me occurs in the surface
structure only after a negative conversion rule of the type ou->me
had been applied. In the environment under discussion it is clear that
the lexical feature "inherently negative" is the context which triggers
the negative conversion rule, but the origin of the ou in the deep
structure which is converted to me as a result of the lexical marking
of that verb is not to be found in any of the assumptions of tradi-
tional grammar. That ou is the negative of the abstract IS NOT SO
which underlies verbs of preventing and so forth and which is the negative-
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meaning element m the deep structure of inherently negative verbs,
and Greek, unlike some other languages, allows optionally for the
representation of that negative in its surface as well as its deep
structure. In vievf of this analysis it is almost otiose to note that
the deep structures of Greek and English and Latin are very similar
indeed.
The me ou pattern operates in other related structures but in
a different manner. Certain verbal constructions consist of a verb
plus a negative—either ou or the alpha-privative ( a bound morpheme
in word-formation which negates or counters, e.g. dunatos "possible" but
adunatos "inipcssible") . These expressions are virtually equivalent
selnantically to non-negated inherent negators and are treated together
with negative-meaning verbs in our grammars. They are of a different
class, however, because their complements may be negated. In this
-A A
^
me ou construction the me is considered the real negative and ou is
again termed redundant or sympathetic* It should be clear by now
that this is an incorrect statement of the syntactic and semantic facts.
The ^ here is the same me, the (converted) negative element of the
deep structure, v/hich follows real inherently negative verbs^ and the
ou negates the complement. In other words the sympathetic ou is a
figment of the received grammatical tradition and is not a viable and
operable grammatical entity. Again, a closer analysis of the sentence
types reveals a consistent pattern of negation. Me ou behaves strictly
in accordance vath the lexical and grammatical features which mark the
verb of its higher sentence, and it is the admissibility or inadmissibility
of negation in the lower sentence which determines the precise manner
A
in which me ou is to be construed. The verbs or verbal expressions are
of the same general class, as witness the presence and function of me
in an identical fashion in all the instances examined, but within that
general class they are subcategorized differently, as witness the
21
semantic variation v/ith regard to ou.
One other class of verbs behaves in a manner so similar to those
verbs we have been discussing that it would be remiss not to take them
into consideration, although it is necessary to point out at the outset
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that verbs of fearing have never been classed vd.th verbs of negative
meaning by classical philologists. Nevertheless the surface structure
of fearing expressions manifests sufficient a priori evidence to do so.
8) phoboumai me tauta genetai I fear this will happen
9) phoboumai me ou tauta genetai I fear this won't happen
We recognize here the same pattern of negation found after thcs e
verbal expressions which are virtual inherent negators and which
22
admit negation in the complement sentence. Here, however, the
complementizer is the oblique mcod, either subjimctive or optative
depending on sequence, not the accusative-infinitive/infinitive
as in the previous instances, but the presence and function of me
after verbs of fearing cannot be distinguished from its presence and
function in those other sentences. They should therefore be considered
A
a negative-meaning verbal expression of some sort, since the me is
surely the negative element of the deep structure, and ou is the negative
which negates the complement. I suggest that the verb of fearing is
23
a real rather than a virtual inherently negative verb which differs
from verbs of hindering in that it allows negation in its complement;
in any case the pattern of negation forces us to consider verbs of
fearing as members of that general class of verbs which are negative-
meaning.
Once we have noticed that one sub-group of negative-meaning
expressions tolerates negation in its complement and that verbs of
fearing are nf this type, we may then posit for classical Greek an
abstract inherently negative verb and in that way account for the
structure of that "independent" subjunctive termed variously a cautious
or modest or doubtful assertion. The construction is apparently not
inherited since it appears first in Herodotus and most frequently in
Plato; it consists of me + subjunctive for a positive statement and
A
me ou for a negative one:
10) me tauta genetai Z (I suspect) this may happen
11) me ou tauta genetai (I suspect) this may not happen
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The same pattern of negation operates here as in the previously
discussed structures, and this is the clearest example in either
Greek or Latin of both the validity and the necessity of abstract
verbs in grammatical analysis. Every syntactic and semantic feature
of sentences (lO) and (ll) —the mood, the negative(s), the meaning —
can be described, but only if an abstract verb is postulated as the
higher sentence and only if that abstract verb is inherently negative
in the same manner as verbs of fearing. No other structure so clearly
exemplifies the close relationship between negation, inherent or other-
wise, and the deep structure, abstract or other\vise.
To conclude this discussion it is necessary only to reiterate
the several conclusions reached at various stages of the separate
analyses, and this I shall fcrepo. Our traditional grammars have
obscured or omitted many significant features of negation patterns in
classical Greek, and these inadequate descriptions must be improved.
I have tried to show how I think this improvement may be attained;
from my discussion it is clear that syntactic as well as semantic
factors are extensively involved, and of these factors some are thoroughly
embedded in the traditional approach to grammar, while others are derived
from concepts totally unfamiliar to philology. It seems to me that the
analysis presented here is superior at least to the traditional ones
which are couched in non-linguistic terras; cf. eg. Smyth's statement:
"The simple negative particles are ou and me. Ou is the negative of
fact and statement, and contradicts or denies ; me is the negative
—'—'———'—
'
p(i
of the will and thought, and re.iects or deprecates "
,
italics his j.
Whatever form a complete and total description of negative patterns
may ultimately take is still a matter of doubt, but I am confident
that among other features it will include a negative conversion rule,
a formal description of abstract syntax at least insofar as it is
applicable, and an in-depth discxission of inherently negative verbs
which subcategorizes those verbs into two classes on the basis of the
behavior of the negative in their conplements
.
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In general, cf. the situation with regard to concord, vMch has
usually been considered a surface structure phenomenon, as discussed
and revised by George Lakoff, "Global Rules," Lg. 46 (1970)
627-639, especially 628-9.
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I say and mean well-defined, even thoxigh a cursory glance at almost
any Greek grammar might seem to belie my assertion; this, of course,
only proves that negation in Greek poses serious problems for linguists
and philologists alike.
3
This is the normative statement; cf . e.g. V/.\7. Goodwin, Syntax of
the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb (Boston 1893) 138: "The
negative particle of the protasis is regularly me , that of the
apodosis is ou." But ou does occur in protases, and this variation
has engendered much debate, to say the least. For a review—though
A
of a curiously personal nature—of scholarly opinions on me and ou
in protases, see B. Th, Koppers, Negative Conditional Sentences
(The Hague, n.d.) 34-38. Koppers' analysis of these negative patterns
sounds hollow at best. She started "from the knowledge that Greek
A
ou does not mean the same as me" and "found that the use of the
different negations can only be explained psychologically not formally"
(both quotes from p. 13). Her knowledge and psychological insight
are, evidently, nothing short of amazing, but it is her conclusion
which is particularly disturbing; at the end of her survey of the
various opinions on the problem (p. 13) she maintains that "there seems
to be no need to underline that the difference has nothing to do
with the structure of the sentence." In spite of statements such
as these it is altogether clear that the normal negative of the
protasis was regularly me, and perhaps the most telling evidence
in favor of this conclusion is Plato' s striking ellipse at Meno
80 C: ei de me, ou ("but if not, not").
4 . . .For example, equi-NP-deletion is a commonplace m accusative-
infinitive (roughly for-to) complementation and is in addition
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acccmpanief'- by obligatory concord readjustments under certain
circumstances, end there are numerous other types of sentences v/hose
surface structures either imply or prove the presence of coreferential
noxm. phrases in the xmderlylng structrare,
5
Greek, unlike Latin, has a full set of participles available for use
in a variety of structures. In addition to the relative and par-
ticiple, the protasis of (3) could also be rendered by a temporal
clause with, of course, the negative me.
I should point out that the negative which I am rendering ou actually
consists of three variants: ou, ouk, and oukh : the conditioning is
phonologica 1: ouk/ V. ou/ C°. oukh/ C".
7
The translation is that of W.H.D. Rouse, Great Dialogues of Plato
(New York: Mentor paperback, 1956) 46O-6I,
8 ^-
In addition to its simple negatives ou and me Greek ha"^ a series of
compound negatives which consist of the simple negative plus some
other word, e.g. ou-pote and mepote "never" and oudeis and medeis "no one."
A
In the Greek quotation medena is a compoimd negative (accusative case).
The corapound negatives are used in precisely the same environments as
their corresponding simple negatives, and whatever syntactic and semantic
features accrue to the simple negatives adhere to their compounds
also. When they occur together in the same clause, word order
becomes important, and a compound negative following a simple
negative only reinforces the original negation, whereas when the word
order is reversed and the simple negative follows the compound, then
each retains its own negative force.
9
The rule is somewhat more specific, and the choice between subjunctive
or imperative is predicated on an aspectual distinction. Excluding
the first person v/here there can be no choice (traditional grammars
seem not to understand why there are no first person imperatives)
,
the choice is between progressive imperative or aoristic subjunctive but
not vice-versa, although there are rare exceptions. The law could
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therefore have been stated in any of several ways, but since iny
concern is with the subjunctive, the imperative need not detain us.
In either case the negative is always me .
Needless to say, this statement is directly at odds with traditional
philology, but then so is this entire discussion.
Robin T. Lakoff, Abstract Syntax and Latin Complementation (Cambridge,
Mass. 1968) 157-21?. All subsequent references to Lakoff are to this
monograph.
Tiakoff, op. cit., 160 and l6l respectively. For the theoretical
significance of Mrs. Lakoff ' s proposals, see the review by Georgia
M. Green, L£ A^ (l9T0) U9-167. Cf. also the review by Fred W.
Householder, Language Sciences . No. 6, August, 1969, pp. 11-18; then
cf. further Robin T. Lakoff, "More on Abstract Syntax," Language
Sciences , No. 10, April, 1970, pp. 30-35 and Fred W. Householder,
"Reviewer's Reply," ibid., pp. 35-6. For the judgement of one of this
country's most distingiiished Latinists on Dr. Lakoff s contribution
to Latin grammatical studies, see the review by Maurice P. Cunningham,
Classical Philology 65 (1970) 273-77.
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H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar , revised by G. M. Messing (Cambridge,
Mass. 1956) 403.
T)iomedes and Priscian are Latin grammarians of the late 4. and late
5 /early 6 centuries respectively, and their statements are
quoted from H, Keil, Grammatici Latini (Leipzig, 1055-1932, 8 vol.)
vol. I, p. 340 and vol. II, p. 424 respectively. The context in
Priscian makes it abundantly clear that verbo must be rendered by "verb."
There are a considerable number of statements of a similar nature
scattered throughout the Greek and Latin grammarians in whose works the
general phenomenon of ellipse played a considerable theoretical and
pragmatic role. See e.g. the R. Schneider and G. Uhlig edition of
Apollonlus Dyscolus (Leipzig, 1902-1910, 3 vol.) vol. 3, pp. 93-94,
for some parallels. In dealing with concepts such as these in the ancient
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grammatical treatises, it is never superfluous to note that the
concepts were not necessarily applied in a systematic fashion,
and this methodological caveat is a not uninportant distinction.
Inasmuch as I am in a position to speak with a certain amount of
authority on the subject of the ancient Greek and Latin grammarians,
I feel constrained to note that several, perhaps many, of the claims
made by modern linguists under the guise of Quellenforschung are
vmfortunately sometimes extravagant and excessive and stould in many
instances be considered merely as tentative suggestions, though I
would hasten to add that most of these suggestions as I have termed
them are uniformly interesting and some fundamentally correct. For
one such sober statement, see the review of Lakoff by G. M. Green
(op. cit., above, n,12) p. 156, and for several perceptive obser-
vations, see the review of Lakoff by M. P. Cunningham (op. cit., above,
n.l2). See also Luigi Romeo and Gaio E. Tiberio, "Historiography of
Linguistics and Rome's Scholarship," Language Sciences , No. 17^
October, 1971, pp. 23-44.
15
On this point see e.g. E. S. Thompson's note to Plato Meno 75 A
in his edition of the Meno (Cambridge, 1901).
Sentences (6) and (7) are adapted from Smyth, op. cit., pp. 623-4.
17
In sentences (6) and (7) the higher sentences are eirgei and ouk
eirgei respectively, and everything follov/ing eirgei is in each
instance the complement sentence,
-1 Q
Lakoff, p. 135.
19
Cf. n.8 above. As the occurrence, even though optional, of the
articles to and ton proves, the complementation process after verbs
of preventing differs from the normal procedure, and vrere it not for
this difference, ray suggestion would be even more tentative than it is,
20
I make this point separate and distinct from iry earlier argument
that the me is the negative-meaning element only because a tree-diagram
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representing (6) as something like "he causes it that you write it
is not so" is so far removed conceptually from the traditional
philological account.
21
For a discussion of these constructions whxch is somewhat more
enlightened than the customary account, see A, C. Moorhouse,
"The Construction rath ME OU," Classical Quarterly 34 (1940) 70-77.
Moorhouse arrives at the same classification as I do, but this is
not at all surprising since the two classes are ]£ept distinct in all
grammars. Needless to say, he does not hit upon the crucial generali-
zation which I have insisted upon and v/hich is the one syntactic and
semantic characteristic which verifies the validity of establishing
the two classes of verbs. There are, as one might expect from the
date of Moorhouse' s article, considerable differences between our
analyses of the me ou. Moorhouse (p. 72) believes that after
doubly negated verbs "the function of ouk in me ouk is to cancel the
me." I confess that at an earlier stage in my study of" these struc-
tures I too, though vmaware of Moorhouse* s conclusion^ adhered to
this explanationi This position, however, is not tenable, because
Greek negatives do not cancel one another, V/e are compelled to
retract the theory of cancellation, for it requires suspending or
transgressing an othervdse comprehensive rule of the language. As
a strictly a^d hoc solution, it may have some pseudo-value pedagogically,
but if applicable anywhere, it is applicable in Latin rather than in
Greek and in a slightly different context. For those who may be
interested in some of the ramifications of the application of
generative grammar to the teaching of the Greek and Latin languages,
I discuss these, in a context dealing with some of the specific
structures under discussion here, in an article entitled "Mures , immo
homines: Rationalism in Language Learning," forthcoming in Classical
Outlook. We can mth justification dismiss cancellation as an ansv/er
to the problem at hand; yet we should probably consider it, though
incorrect, as a step in the right direction, Moorhouse is himself
aware that his porition cannot be maintained in the structures
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following what I have termed virtual inherent negators and for all
practical puirposes gives up in despair when he states (p. 73) that
"me ou here is simply an illogical copy of the use of e^ ou after
verbs of class (l), verbs of denying, preventing, etc." This statement
is in manifest violation of the facts, and it is with more crn-
fidenco than might be normally expected that I offer ray ovm solution
A
to the use of me ou in the complements after the two classes of
negative-meaning verbs and verbal expressions.
22
The exainples are again adapted from Smyth, p. 501. There are tvro
explanations of constructions involving verbs of fearing in Greek
(and Latin also) which may be called traditional, but neither merits
serious consideration. The first states that me is not a negative
but is a conjrmction meaning "that" or lest;" confusinn begets con-
fusion. The second analyzes the sentence as consisting of tvro in-
dependent entities which are then paratactically conjoined; neither
of these entities exists elsewhere in the language, of coxirse, and
this explanation derives directly from the assumption of a verifiable
"me Tarzan you Jane" stage in diachronic syntax.
23
The distinction may not be necessary except insofar as the neo-
grammarian habit of attaching labels to grammatical constructions is
concerned. The important distinction is that verbs of fearing tolerate
negation in their complements; this, of course, is a characteristic
which they do not share with real inherent negators such as verbs of
preventing. On the other hand their inherently negative meaning, as
evidenced by the negation pattern, is not dependent on a negative
morpheme, as is the case with virtual inherent negators. The choice
in classifying therefore seems determined by the system of classi-
fication and not essential to an understanding of the structural
description.
2/
Goodwin, op cit., p. 92.
25
These examples are mine. The negative construction here is usually
compared, correctly, to that with verbs of fearing, but the negative
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and subjunctive construction as a whole is, unfortunately, treated
separately.
Sioyth, p. 608. I certainly do not intend to pick on Smyth to the
exclusion of other Greek grammars; Smyth's grammar is probably the
most widely used one in the country, and for that reason, one of
convenience, I have tried wherever possible to confine my references
to his rather than to some other grammar.
